On the Optimal Taxation of Common-Pool Resources

Georgios Kossioris, Michael Plexousakis, Anastasios Xepapadeas and Aart Fe Zeeuw

No 94619, Sustainable Development Papers from Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)

Abstract: Recent research developments in common-pool resource models emphasize the importance of links with ecological systems and the presence of non-linearities, thresholds and multiple steady states. In a recent paper Kossioris et al. (2008) develop a methodology for deriving feedback Nash equilibria for non-linear differential games and apply this methodology to a common-pool resource model of a lake where pollution corresponds to benefits and at the same time affects the ecosystem services. This paper studies the structure of optimal state- dependent taxes that steer the combined economic-ecological system towards the trajectory of optimal management, and provides an algorithm for calculating such taxes.

Keywords: Environmental; Economics; and; Policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 26
Date: 2010
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/94619/files/NDL2010-101.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: On the optimal taxation of common-pool resources (2011)
Working Paper: On the Optimal Taxation of Common-Pool Resources (2010)
Working Paper: On the Optimal Taxation of Common-Pool Resources (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:feemdp:94619

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.94619

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