Standardization Policy and International Trade

Neil Gandal and Oz Shy

No 275615, Foerder Institute for Economic Research Working Papers from Tel-Aviv University > Foerder Institute for Economic Research

Abstract: In this paper we examine the incentives for governments to recognize the standards of foreign products. In the case of non-recognition, a foreign firm must incur an additional cost to sell in the local market. In the benchmark case, we assume that governmental policy is limited to either (1) recognizing all foreign standards or (2) not recognizing any standards. We then enrich the model and investigate whether countries can gain by forming blocks (standardization unions) which entail mutual standard recognition among member countries.

Keywords: Financial Economics; International Relations/Trade (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 32
Date: 1996-04
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Standardization policy and international trade (2001)
Working Paper: Standardization Policy and International Trade (1996)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:isfiwp:275615

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.275615

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