An Alternative Explanation of the Chance of Casting a Pivotal Vote

Dan Usher

No 273738, Queen's Economics Department Working Papers from Queen's University - Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper is about a model of uncertainty in voting that allows for a schedule of people's preferences for one party over another, that gives rise to a chance of casting a pivotal vote which is small but not, as often supposed, infinitesimal, that is not inconsistent with evidence about the chance of casting a pivotal vote and that preserves a role for self-interest, along with a duty to vote, in the decision whether to vote or abstain.

Keywords: Public; Economics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 32
Date: 2011-11
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https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/273738/files/qed_wp_1238.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: An alternative explanation of the chance of casting a pivotal vote (2014)
Working Paper: An Alternative Explanation Of The Chance Of Casting A Pivotal Vote (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:quedwp:273738

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.273738

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