Endogenous Organizational Restructuring: Status, Productivity, & Meritocratic Dynamics

Ashutosh Thakur () and Jonathan Bendor ()
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Ashutosh Thakur: Stanford Graduate School of Business and University of Cologne
Jonathan Bendor: Stanford Graduate School of Business

No 84, ECONtribute Discussion Papers Series from University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Germany

Abstract: We model the dynamics of endogenous organizational restructuring, where those being assigned positions in an organization can themselves lobby for who gets which position. Internal labor market changes depend on how much individuals value their own status in the organization, the organizational output, their friends' welfare, and the quality of their own departmental colleagues. Meritocratic assignments are reached with probability one when agents value organizational output even with epsilon weight, provided friend networks and departments are not too large. We also characterize the effects of various voting rules, agendas, and specializations on the paths and the stability of organizational structures.

Keywords: organizational reform; assignment; voting; institutions; meritocracy; status (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 39 pages
Date: 2021-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic
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https://www.econtribute.de/RePEc/ajk/ajkdps/ECONtribute_084_2021.pdf First version, 2021 (application/pdf)

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