A Theory of Auditability for Allocation Mechanisms

Aram Grigoryan (ag@ucsd.edu) and Markus Möller (mmoelle2@uni-bonn.de)
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Aram Grigoryan: University of California
Markus Möller: University of Bonn

No 308, ECONtribute Discussion Papers Series from University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Germany

Abstract: In centralized mechanisms and platforms, participants do not fully observe each others' type reports. Hence, if there is a deviation from the promised mechanism, participants may be unable to detect it. We formalize a notion of auditabilty that captures how easy or hard it is to detect deviations from a mechanism. We find a stark contrast between the auditabilities of prominent mechanisms. We also provide tight characterizations of maximally auditable classes of allocation mechanisms.

Keywords: Auditability; Allocation Mechanisms (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D47 D80 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 102
Date: 2024-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des and nep-mic
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