Robust Rules for Voluntary Disclosure: When Commitment Matters

Sarah Auster () and Helene Mass ()
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Sarah Auster: University of Bonn, Department of Economics & CEPR
Helene Mass: Department of Economics & University of Vienna

No 435, ECONtribute Discussion Papers Series from University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Germany

Abstract: We study the value of commitment in verifiable disclosure games when the receiver faces non-quantifiable uncertainty about the evidence environment. The sender has stochastic access to hard evidence and may disclose or suppress it; the receiver chooses a decision rule to maximize her payoff guarantee. When ambiguity concerns the payoff state, the receiver has strict incentives to soften her standards ex post after non-disclosure, making commitment strictly valuable. When ambiguity concerns the sender’s expertise, incentives reverse: the receiver prefers a stricter reaction than is ex-ante optimal, so prespecified, hard-wired rules for non-disclosure improve payoffs for both sides.

Keywords: Ambiguity; Commitment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D81 D82 D86 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 22 pages
Date: 2026-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des and nep-mic
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ajk:ajkdps:435

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