Beyond Testing: Empirical Models of Insurance Markets

Liran Einav, Amy Finkelstein and Jonathan Levin

Annual Review of Economics, 2010, vol. 2, issue 1, 311-336

Abstract: We describe recent advances in the empirical analysis of insurance markets. This new research proposes ways to estimate individual demand for insurance and the relationship between prices and insurer costs in the presence of adverse and advantageous selection. We discuss how these models permit the measurement of welfare distortions arising from asymmetric information and the welfare consequences of potential government policy responses. We also discuss some challenges in modeling imperfect competition between insurers and outline a series of open research questions.

Keywords: asymmetric information; adverse selection (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 G22 G28 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (111)

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Working Paper: Beyond Testing: Empirical Models of Insurance Markets (2009)
Working Paper: Beyond Testing: Empirical Models of Insurance Markets (2009)
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