Group Obvious Strategy-proofness: Definition and Characterization

Pablo Arribillaga, Jordi Massó and Alejandro Neme
Additional contact information
Pablo Arribillaga: UNSL/CONICET
Jordi Massó: Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona/Barcelona School of Economics
Alejandro Neme: UNSL/CONICET

No 372, Working Papers from Red Nacional de Investigadores en Economía (RedNIE)

Abstract: We introduce the concept of group obvious strategy-proofness, an extension of Li (2017)’s notion of obvious strategy-proofness, by requiring that truth-tellingremains an obviously dominant strategy for any group of agents in the extensive game form implementing the social choice function. We show that this stronger condition isno more restrictive: the set of all group obviously strategy-proof social choice functions coincides with the set of all obviously strategy-proof social choice functions. Building on this equivalence result and existing results on obvious strategy-proofness, we derive further equivalence results concerning the implementability of social choice functions via round-table mechanisms: strategy-proofness, group strategy-proofness, obvious strategy-proofness, and group obvious strategy-proofness are all equivalent.

Keywords: Group strategy-proofness; Obvious strategy-proofness. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 14 pages
Date: 2025-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des and nep-mic
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://rednie.eco.unc.edu.ar/files/DT/372.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aoz:wpaper:372

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from Red Nacional de Investigadores en Economía (RedNIE) Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Laura Inés D Amato ().