Corporate Non-Disclosure Disputes: Equilibrium Settlements with a Probabilistic Burden of Proof

Miles B. Gietzmann and Adam J. Ostaszewski

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: The literature of damages-assessment under the US disclosure 10b-5 rule proposes multiple formulations for a "proper measure" based on the legal "out-of-pocket" principle, i.e. the difference between original and an observed later price consequent on revealed information, with suspected prior disclosure omission. Key is the evolution of a putative "price-but for the omission". Proposed procedures include back-casting and forward-casting (between two dates, or via multiple intervening dates) -- Ferrell and Saha (2011). We derive, consistently with fair-pricing, a new model of induced litigation-behaviour referring to prices at and just before the revelation date. Parameters incentivise withholding of price-sensitive news under a `sparing' strategy.

Date: 2024-10
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