A deterministic electoral system satisfying Arrow's four conditions in an easily approached limit

Roger F. Sewell

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Abstract: In 1950 Arrow famously showed that there is no social welfare function satisfying four basic conditions. In 1976, on the other hand, Gibbard and Sonnenschein showed that there does exist a unique probabilistic social welfare method that satisfies a different set of strictly stronger conditions. In this paper we discuss a deterministic electoral method satisfying those same stronger conditions in an appropriate sense; it is not a counterexample to either of these theorems. We attach a simple reference implementation written in C with executables for Linux and Windows.

Date: 2025-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic
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