Sticky information and price controls: Evidence from a natural experiment

Doron Sayag, Avichai Snir and Daniel Levy ()

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: We test the predictions of the sticky information model using a survey dataset by comparing shoppers accuracy in recalling the prices of regulated and comparable unregulated products. Because regulated product prices are capped, they are sold more than comparable unregulated products, while their prices change less frequently and vary less across stores and between brands, than the prices of comparable unregulated products. Therefore, shoppers would be expected to recall the regulated product prices more accurately. However, we find that shoppers are better at recalling the prices of unregulated products, in line with the sticky information model which predicts that shoppers will be more attentive to prices that change more frequently.

Date: 2025-02
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Published in Economics Letters (Forthcoming), 2025

Downloads: (external link)
http://arxiv.org/pdf/2502.15974 Latest version (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Sticky information and price controls: Evidence from a natural experiment (2025)
Journal Article: Sticky information and price controls: Evidence from a natural experiment (2025)
Working Paper: Sticky information and price controls: Evidence from a natural experiment (2025)
Working Paper: Sticky Information and Price Controls: Evidence from a Natural Experiment (2025)
Working Paper: Sticky information and price controls: Evidence from a natural experiment (2025)
Working Paper: Sticky Information and Price Controls: Evidence from a Natural Experiment (2025)
Working Paper: Sticky Information and Price Controls: Evidence from a Natural Experiment (2025)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:arx:papers:2502.15974

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Papers from arXiv.org
Bibliographic data for series maintained by arXiv administrators ().