Incomplete Information Robustness

Stephen Morris and Takashi Ui

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: Consider an analyst who models a strategic situation using an incomplete information game. The true game may involve correlated, duplicated belief hierarchies, but the analyst lacks knowledge of the correlation structure and can only approximate each belief hierarchy. To make predictions in this setting, the analyst uses belief-invariant Bayes correlated equilibria (BIBCE) and seeks to determine which one is justifiable. We address this question by introducing the notion of robustness: a BIBCE is robust if, for every nearby incomplete information game, there exists a BIBCE close to it. Our main result provides a sufficient condition for robustness using a generalized potential function. In a supermodular potential game, a robust BIBCE is a Bayes Nash equilibrium, whereas this need not hold in other classes of games.

Date: 2025-02, Revised 2025-02
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