Cued to Queue: Information in Waiting-Line Auctions

Jack Hirsch and Eric Tang

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: We study the effect of providing information to agents who queue before a scarce good is distributed at a fixed time. When agents have quasi-linear utility in time spent waiting, they choose entry times as they would bids in a descending auction. An information designer can influence their behavior by providing updates about the length of the queue. Many natural information policies release "sudden bad news," which occurs when agents learn that the queue is longer than previously believed. We show that sudden bad news can cause assortative inefficiency by prompting a mass of agents to simultaneously attempt to join the queue. As a result, if the value distribution has an increasing (decreasing) hazard rate, information policies that release sudden bad news increase (decrease) total surplus, relative to releasing no information. When agents face entry costs to join the queue and the value distribution has a decreasing hazard rate, an information designer maximizes total surplus by announcing only when the queue is full.

Date: 2025-02, Revised 2025-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des and nep-mic
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