Shinohara Rock-Paper-Scissors

Takashi Ui

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: This paper analyzes Shinohara Rock-Paper-Scissors (RPS), a variant of the classic RPS game introduced by board game designer Yoshiteru Shinohara. Players compete against a host who always plays rock, so players choose either rock or paper. The twist is that if two or more players choose paper, they are eliminated, and the last remaining player is the winner, creating strategic tension among the players. There exists a unique symmetric subgame perfect equilibrium, in which the probability of choosing paper satisfies the equation $(1-p)^{n-1} + p^{n-1}/n = 1/n$, where $n$ is the number of remaining players. The game also admits a continuum of asymmetric equilibria.

Date: 2025-03, Revised 2025-03
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