A Combinatorial Auction Design for Formulary Positions

Lawrence W. Abrams

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Abstract: The purpose of this paper is to apply the economics field of market design to develop a simple algebraic and graphic model of a combinatorial auction for formulary position assignments.

Date: 2025-04
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:arx:papers:2504.02200

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