The Tension between Trust and Oversight in Long-term Relationships

Peter Achim and Jan Knoepfle

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: A principal continually decides whether to approve resource allocations to an agent, who exerts private effort to remain eligible. The principal must perform costly inspections to determine the agent's eligibility. We characterize Markov Perfect Equilibria and analyze the paths of trust and oversight that emerge from the dynamic interplay of effort and oversight. At high trust levels, effort is an intertemporal substitute to oversight, which leads to unique interior effort choices and random inspections. At low trust levels, effort is an intertemporal complement to oversight, which may create a coordination problem, leading to equilibrium multiplicity. Voluntary disclosure can mitigate this coordination issue.

Date: 2025-04
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