Separable choices

Davide Carpentiere, Alfio Giarlotta, Angelo Petralia and Ester Sudano

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: We introduce the novel setting of joint choices, in which options are vectors with components associated to different dimensions. In this framework, menus are multidimensional, being vectors whose components are one-dimensional menus, that is, nonempty subsets of elements associated to each dimension. We provide a natural notion of separability, requiring that selections from some dimensions are never affected by those performed on the remaining dimensions. Stability of separability across dimensions is throughly investigated. Moreover, we analyze rationalizable joint choices, which are those explained by the maximization of a revealed preference. The interplay between rationalizability e separability of joint choices allows to show that latter extends the classical definition of separability of discrete preference relations, and to assess the consistency of the former across dimensions.

Date: 2025-04, Revised 2025-04
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