A model-based analysis of the AggregateEU mechanism: Implications of overbidding and non-commitment

D\'avid Csercsik, Borb\'ala Tak\'acsn\'e T\'oth, P\'eter Kotek, L\'aszl\'o \'A. K\'oczy and Anne Neumann

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Abstract: AggregateEU is a new centralised mechanism that provides a no-commitment platform to trade natural gas in the European Union. Throughout the consultation process, AggregateEU has been mocked as `Tinder of the European gas markets' as it helps consumers and suppliers to find partners, but leaves it up to the matched partners to decide whether or not to contract on the possible trade. The non-commitment nature leads to substantial overbidding and many non-realised matches. We propose a quantitative modelling framework to study the effect of overbidding in the AggergateEU demand aggregation or joint purchasing mechanism. We conclude that the mechanism is prone to overbidding and that overbidding has ambiguous effects on trade. Depending on the parameters, overbidding may facilitate trade, but may also result in highly inefficient outcomes when overbidding is combined with a miscoordination over the delivery points. Suggested remedies include allowing for convex bids, restrictions on overbidding, or giving up part of the non-binding character of the market. %Ideally, the traditional mechanisms of gas exchanges should be augmented by features of AggregateEU. Our results sugge

Date: 2025-04
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