Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning for Greenhouse Gas Offset Credit Markets

Liam Welsh, Udit Grover and Sebastian Jaimungal

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: Climate change is a major threat to the future of humanity, and its impacts are being intensified by excess man-made greenhouse gas emissions. One method governments can employ to control these emissions is to provide firms with emission limits and penalize any excess emissions above the limit. Excess emissions may also be offset by firms who choose to invest in carbon reducing and capturing projects. These projects generate offset credits which can be submitted to a regulating agency to offset a firm's excess emissions, or they can be traded with other firms. In this work, we characterize the finite-agent Nash equilibrium for offset credit markets. As computing Nash equilibria is an NP-hard problem, we utilize the modern reinforcement learning technique Nash-DQN to efficiently estimate the market's Nash equilibria. We demonstrate not only the validity of employing reinforcement learning methods applied to climate themed financial markets, but also the significant financial savings emitting firms may achieve when abiding by the Nash equilibria through numerical experiments.

Date: 2025-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ppm
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