Propagational Proxy Voting

Yasushi Sakai, Parfait Atchade-Adelomou, Ryan Jiang, Luis Alonso, Kent Larson and Ken Suzuki

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: This paper proposes a voting process in which voters allocate fractional votes to their expected utility in different domains: over proposals, other participants, and sets containing proposals and participants. This approach allows for a more nuanced expression of preferences by calculating the result and relevance within each node. We modeled this by creating a voting matrix that reflects their preference. We use absorbing Markov chains to gain the consensus, and also calculate the influence within the participating nodes. We illustrate this method in action through an experiment with 69 students using a budget allocation topic.

Date: 2025-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-des and nep-exp
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