Can Nash inform capital requirements? Allocating systemic risk measures

\c{C}a\u{g}{\i}n Ararat and Zachary Feinstein

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Abstract: Systemic risk measures aggregate the risks from multiple financial institutions to find system-wide capital requirements. Though much attention has been given to assessing the level of systemic risk, less has been given to allocating that risk to the constituent institutions. Within this work, we propose a Nash allocation rule that is inspired by game theory. Intuitively, to construct these capital allocations, the banks compete in a game to reduce their own capital requirements while, simultaneously, maintaining system-level acceptability. We provide sufficient conditions for the existence and uniqueness of Nash allocation rules, and apply our results to the prominent structures used for systemic risk measures in the literature. We demonstrate the efficacy of Nash allocations with numerical case studies using the Eisenberg-Noe aggregation mechanism.

Date: 2025-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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