Optimal Platform Design

Cole Wittbrodt

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: Search and matching increasingly takes place on online platforms. These platforms have elements of centralized and decentralized matching; platforms can alter the search process for its users, but are unable to eliminate search frictions entirely. I study a model where platforms can change the distribution of potential partners that an agent searches over and characterize search equilibria on platforms. When agents possess private information about their match characteristics and the platform designer acts as a profit maximizing monopolist, I characterize the optimal platform. If match characteristics are complementary and utility is transferable, I show that the solution to this screening problem is efficient, despite the presence of hidden information and market power. Matching under the optimal platform is perfectly assortative -- there is no equilibrium mismatch.

Date: 2025-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des, nep-ind, nep-mic, nep-pay and nep-upt
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://arxiv.org/pdf/2505.00205 Latest version (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:arx:papers:2505.00205

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Papers from arXiv.org
Bibliographic data for series maintained by arXiv administrators ().