Robust Online Learning with Private Information

Kyohei Okumura

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: This paper investigates the robustness of online learning algorithms when learners possess private information. No-external-regret algorithms, prevalent in machine learning, are vulnerable to strategic manipulation, allowing an adaptive opponent to extract full surplus. Even standard no-weak-external-regret algorithms, designed for optimal learning in stationary environments, exhibit similar vulnerabilities. This raises a fundamental question: can a learner simultaneously prevent full surplus extraction by adaptive opponents while maintaining optimal performance in well-behaved environments? To address this, we model the problem as a two-player repeated game, where the learner with private information plays against the environment, facing ambiguity about the environment's types: stationary or adaptive. We introduce \emph{partial safety} as a key design criterion for online learning algorithms to prevent full surplus extraction. We then propose the \emph{Explore-Exploit-Punish} (\textsf{EEP}) algorithm and prove that it satisfies partial safety while achieving optimal learning in stationary environments, and has a variant that delivers improved welfare performance. Our findings highlight the risks of applying standard online learning algorithms in strategic settings with adverse selection. We advocate for a shift toward online learning algorithms that explicitly incorporate safeguards against strategic manipulation while ensuring strong learning performance.

Date: 2025-05, Revised 2025-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta, nep-gth, nep-mac and nep-mic
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