Eliciting Informed Preferences

Modibo K. Camara, Nicole Immorlica and Brendan Lucier

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: If people find it costly to evaluate the options available to them, their choices may not directly reveal their preferences. Yet, it is conceivable that a researcher can still learn about a population's preferences with careful experiment design. We formalize the researcher's problem in a model of robust mechanism design where it is costly for individuals to learn about how much they value a product. We characterize the statistics that the researcher can identify, and find that they are quite restricted. Finally, we apply our positive results to social choice and propose a way to combat uninformed voting.

Date: 2025-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dcm, nep-des and nep-mic
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://arxiv.org/pdf/2505.19570 Latest version (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:arx:papers:2505.19570

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Papers from arXiv.org
Bibliographic data for series maintained by arXiv administrators ().