Learning to Charge More: A Theoretical Study of Collusion by Q-Learning Agents

Cristian Chica, Yinglong Guo and Gilad Lerman

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: There is growing experimental evidence that $Q$-learning agents may learn to charge supracompetitive prices. We provide the first theoretical explanation for this behavior in infinite repeated games. Firms update their pricing policies based solely on observed profits, without computing equilibrium strategies. We show that when the game admits both a one-stage Nash equilibrium price and a collusive-enabling price, and when the $Q$-function satisfies certain inequalities at the end of experimentation, firms learn to consistently charge supracompetitive prices. We introduce a new class of one-memory subgame perfect equilibria (SPEs) and provide conditions under which learned behavior is supported by naive collusion, grim trigger policies, or increasing strategies. Naive collusion does not constitute an SPE unless the collusive-enabling price is a one-stage Nash equilibrium, whereas grim trigger policies can.

Date: 2025-05
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