Becoming Immutable: How Ethereum is Made

Andrea Canidio and Vabuk Pahari

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: We analyze blocks proposed for inclusion in the Ethereum blockchain during 8 minutes on December 3rd, 2024. Our dataset comprises 38 winning blocks, 15,097 proposed blocks, 10,793 unique transactions, and 2,380,014 transaction-block pairings. We find that exclusive transactions--transactions present only in blocks proposed by a single builder--account for 85% of the fees paid by all transactions included in winning blocks. We also find that a surprisingly large number of user transactions are delayed: although proposed during a bidding cycle, they are not included in the corresponding winning block. Many such delayed transactions are exclusive to a losing builder. We also identify two arbitrage bots trading between decentralized (DEX) and centralized exchanges (CEX). By examining their bidding dynamics, we estimate that the implied price at which these bots trade USDC/WETH and USDT/WETH on CEXes is between 3.4 and 4.2 basis points better than the contemporaneous price reported on Binance.

Date: 2025-06
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