Limits of Disclosure in Search Markets

Raphael Boleslavsky and Silvana Krasteva

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: This paper examines competitive information disclosure in search markets with a mix of savvy consumers, who search costlessly, and inexperienced consumers, who face positive search costs. Savvy consumers incentivize truthful disclosure; inexperienced consumers, concealment. With both types, equilibrium features partial disclosure, which persists despite intense competition: in large markets, firms always conceal low valuations. Inexperienced consumers may search actively, but only in small markets. While savvy consumers benefit from increased competition, inexperienced consumers may be harmed. Changes in search costs have non-monotone effects: when costs are low, sufficient reductions increase informativeness and welfare; when costs are high, the opposite.

Date: 2025-05, Revised 2025-06
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