Upstream competition and exclusive content provision in media markets

Kiho Yoon

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: With a multilateral vertical contracting model of media markets, we examine upstream competition and contractual arrangements in content provision. We analyze the trade of content by the Nash bargaining solution and the downstream competition by the Hotelling location model. We characterize the equilibrium outcomes and the contractual arrangements for various vertical structures. We show that the possibility of exclusive contracts rises when the value of the premium content increases, the degree of horizontal differentiation in the downstream market decreases, the importance of advertising revenue decreases, and the relative bargaining power of upstream firm decreases.

Date: 2025-06
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