Binary Self-Selective Voting Rules

H\'ector Hermida-Rivera and Toygar T. Kerman

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Abstract: This paper introduces a novel binary stability property for voting rules-called binary self-selectivity-by which a society considering whether to replace its voting rule using itself in pairwise elections will choose not to do so. In Theorem 1, we show that a neutral voting rule is binary self-selective if and only if it is universally self-selective. We then use this equivalence to show, in Corollary 1, that under the unrestricted strict preference domain, a unanimous and neutral voting rule is binary self-selective if and only if it is dictatorial. In Theorem 2 and Corollary 2, we show that whenever there is a strong Condorcet winner; a unanimous, neutral and anonymous voting rule is binary self-selective (or universally self-selective) if and only if it is the Condorcet voting rule.

Date: 2025-06
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Published in Journal of Public Economic Theory, 27.3, 2025, p. 1-7

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