Machine-Learning to Trust

Ran Spiegler

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: Can players sustain long-run trust when their equilibrium beliefs are shaped by machine-learning methods that penalize complexity? I study a game in which an infinite sequence of agents with one-period recall decides whether to place trust in their immediate successor. The cost of trusting is state-dependent. Each player's best response is based on a belief about others' behavior, which is a coarse fit of the true population strategy with respect to a partition of relevant contingencies. In equilibrium, this partition minimizes the sum of the mean squared prediction error and a complexity penalty proportional to its size. Relative to symmetric mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium, this solution concept significantly narrows the scope for trust.

Date: 2025-07
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