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Policy Learning under Unobserved Confounding: A Robust and Efficient Approach

Zequn Jin, Gaoqian Xu, Xi Zheng and Yahong Zhou

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: This paper develops a robust and efficient method for policy learning from observational data in the presence of unobserved confounding, complementing existing instrumental variable (IV) based approaches. We employ the marginal sensitivity model (MSM) to relax the commonly used yet restrictive unconfoundedness assumption by introducing a sensitivity parameter that captures the extent of selection bias induced by unobserved confounders. Building on this framework, we consider two distributionally robust welfare criteria, defined as the worst-case welfare and policy improvement functions, evaluated over an uncertainty set of counterfactual distributions characterized by the MSM. Closed-form expressions for both welfare criteria are derived. Leveraging these identification results, we construct doubly robust scores and estimate the robust policies by maximizing the proposed criteria. Our approach accommodates flexible machine learning methods for estimating nuisance components, even when these converge at moderately slow rate. We establish asymptotic regret bounds for the resulting policies, providing a robust guarantee against the most adversarial confounding scenario. The proposed method is evaluated through extensive simulation studies and empirical applications to the JTPA study and Head Start program.

Date: 2025-07
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