Optimally Dictatorial Committees

D. Carlos Akkar

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: I study the optimal voting mechanism for a committee that must decide whether to enact or block a policy of unknown benefit. Information can come both from committee members who can acquire it at cost, and a strategic lobbyist who wishes the policy to be enacted. I show that the dictatorship of the most-demanding member is a dominant voting mechanism: any other voting mechanism is (i) less likely to enact a good policy, (ii) more likely to enact a bad policy, and (iii) burdens each member with a greater cost of acquiring information.

Date: 2025-07, Revised 2025-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-des and nep-mic
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