Bayesian tit-for-tat fosters cooperation in evolutionary stochastic games

Arunava Patra, Supratim Sengupta and Sagar Chakraborty

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: Learning from experience is a key feature of decision-making in cognitively complex organisms. Strategic interactions involving Bayesian inferential strategies can enable us to better understand how evolving individual choices to be altruistic or selfish can affect collective outcomes in social dilemmas. Bayesian strategies are distinguished, from their reactive opponents, in their ability to modulate their actions in the light of new evidence. We investigate whether such strategies can be resilient against reactive strategies when actions not only determine the immediate payoff but can affect future payoffs by changing the state of the environment. We use stochastic games to mimic the change in environment in a manner that is conditioned on the players' actions. By considering three distinct rules governing transitions between a resource-rich and a resource-poor states, we ascertain the conditions under which Bayesian tit-for-tat strategy can resist being invaded by reactive strategies. We find that the Bayesian strategy is resilient against a large class of reactive strategies and is more effective in fostering cooperation leading to sustenance of the resource-rich state. However, the extent of success of the Bayesian strategies depends on the other strategies in the pool and the rule governing transition between the two different resource states.

Date: 2025-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-evo and nep-gth
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