Procedural Mixture Sets

Hendrik Rommeswinkel

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: The paper characterizes the Shannon (1948) and Tsallis (1988) entropies in a standard framework of decision theory, mixture sets. Procedural mixture sets are introduced as a variant of mixture sets in which it is not necessarily true that a mixture of two identical elements yields the same element. This allows the process of mixing itself to have an intrinsic value. The paper proves the surprising result that simply imposing the standard axioms of von Neumann-Morgenstern on preferences on a procedural mixture set yields the entropy as a representation of procedural value. An application of the theorem to decision processes and the relation between choice probabilities and decision times elucidates the difficulty of extending the drift-diffusion model to multi-alternative choice.

Date: 2025-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dcm and nep-mic
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