Sequential Non-Bayesian Persuasion

Yaron Azrieli and Rachana Das

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: We study a model of persuasion in which the receiver is a `conservative Bayesian' whose updated belief is a convex combination of the prior and the correct Bayesian posterior. While in the classic Bayesian case providing information sequentially is never valuable, we show that the sender gains from sequential persuasion in many of the environments considered in the literature on strategic information transmission. We also consider the case in which the sender and receiver are both biased and prove that the maximal expected payoff for the sender under sequential persuasion is the same as in the case where neither of them is biased.

Date: 2025-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-inv and nep-mic
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