Dynamic Non-Bayesian Persuasion

Masanori Kobayashi

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: We study a multi-step persuasion problem involving a Bayesian sender and a non-Bayesian receiver. When the receiver deviates from Bayesian updating, the sender may benefit from -- or be harmed by -- gradually revealing information over time. We show that under divisible updating rules (Cripps, 2018), delaying information provision does not affect the sender's ex-ante value. Focusing on the $\alpha$--$\beta$ rule of Grether (1980), we derive the necessary and sufficient conditions under which the sender is strictly better or worse off under a two-step persuasion scheme.

Date: 2025-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des, nep-gth and nep-mic
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