Price Regulation with Spillovers

Chengqing Li and Junjie Zhou

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Abstract: We examine price regulation for monopolists in networks with demand spillovers. The Pareto frontier of the profit-surplus set is characterized using a centrality-based price family. Under typical price regulation policies, regulated outcomes are generically Pareto inefficient at fixed spillover levels but become neutral as spillovers grow, with relative profit loss and surplus changes vanishing. Welfare impacts of banning price discrimination under strong spillovers depend solely on the correlation between intrinsic values and network summary statistics. In networks with two node types (e.g., coreperiphery or complete bipartite), intrinsic value averages across node types suffice for welfare comparisons.

Date: 2025-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-mic, nep-net and nep-reg
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:arx:papers:2508.17301

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