Ambiguous Persuasion with Prior Ambiguity

Xiaoyu Cheng

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: Cheng (2025) establishes that in a persuasion game where both the sender and the receiver have Maxmin Expected Utility (MEU) preferences, the sender never strictly benefits from using ambiguous communication strategies over standard (non-ambiguous) ones. This note extends the analysis to environments with prior ambiguity, i.e., pre-existing ambiguity about the payoff-relevant state, and shows that, in the binary state and binary action case, the same no-gain result continues to hold.

Date: 2025-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-mic and nep-upt
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