Public Persuasion with Endogenous Fact-Checking

Georgy Lukyanov () and Samuel Safaryan

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Abstract: We study public persuasion when a sender faces a mass audience that can verify the state at heterogeneous costs. The sender commits ex ante to a public information policy but must satisfy an ex post truthfulness constraint on verifiable content (EPIC). Receivers verify selectively, generating a verifying mass that depends on the public posterior mu. This yields an indirect value v(mu;F) and a concavification problem under implementability. Our main result is a reverse comparative static: when verification becomes cheaper (an FOSD improvement in F), v becomes more concave and the optimal public signal is strictly less informative (Blackwell). Intuitively, greater verifiability makes extreme claims invite scrutiny, so the sender optimally coarsens information - "confusion as strategy." We extend the model to two ex post instruments: falsification (continuous manipulation) and violence (a fixed-cost discrete tool), and characterize threshold substitutions from persuasion to manipulation and repression. The framework speaks to propaganda under improving fact-checking.

Date: 2025-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
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