Reputational Conservatism in Expert Advice

Georgy Lukyanov and Anna Vlasova

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Abstract: We develop a tractable career-concerns model of expert recommendations with a continuous private signal. In equilibrium, advice obeys a cutoff rule: the expert recommends the risky option if and only if the signal exceeds a threshold. Under a mild relative-diagnosticity condition, the threshold is (weakly) increasing in reputation, yielding reputational conservatism. Signal informativeness and success priors lower the cutoff, while stronger career concerns raise it. A success-contingent bonus implements any target experimentation rate via a one-to-one mapping, providing an implementable design lever.

Date: 2025-09, Revised 2025-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
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