Noisy Certification in a Duopolistic Setting with Loss-Averse Buyers

Dmitry Shapiro and Tri Phu Vu

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Abstract: This paper studies how noise in certification technology affects seller profits in a duopoly with unobservable product quality. We identify two opposing effects of noisy certification. First, it reduces the informativeness of certification outcomes, homogenizing buyers' beliefs and limiting the scope for vertical differentiation. Second, it introduces randomness into buyer perceptions, endogenously generating differentiation between otherwise similar products. When buyers are risk-neutral, the first effect dominates, reducing seller profits. However, when buyers are loss averse, the negative impact of reduced informativeness is mitigated, and noisy certification can increase profits relative to accurate certification. Experimentally, treatments with inaccurate certification are more profitable than those with accurate certification, particularly in settings with intense competition.

Date: 2025-09
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