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The Paradox of Doom: Acknowledging Extinction Risk Reduces the Incentive to Prevent It

Jakub Growiec and Klaus Prettner

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: We investigate the salience of extinction risk as a source of impatience. Our framework distinguishes between human extinction risk and individual mortality risk while allowing for various degrees of intergenerational altruism. Additionally, we consider the evolutionarily motivated "selfish gene" perspective. We find that the risk of human extinction is an indispensable component of the discount rate, whereas individual mortality risk can be hedged against - partially or fully, depending on the setup - through human reproduction. Overall, we show that in the face of extinction risk, people become more impatient rather than more farsighted. Thus, the greater the threat of extinction, the less incentive there is to invest in avoiding it. Our framework can help explain why humanity consistently underinvests in mitigation of catastrophic risks, ranging from climate change mitigation, via pandemic prevention, to addressing the emerging risks of transformative artificial intelligence.

Date: 2025-09
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Working Paper: The Paradox of Doom: Acknowledging Extinction Risk Reduces the Incentive to Prevent It (2025) Downloads
Working Paper: The Paradox of Doom: Acknowledging Extinction Risk Reduces the Incentive to Prevent It (2025) Downloads
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