Public Communication with Externalities

Georgy Lukyanov, Konstantin Shamruk, Tong Su and Ahmed Wakrim

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: This paper develops a model in which a sender strategically communicates with a group of receivers whose payoffs depend on the sender's information. It is shown that aggregate payoff externalities create an endogenous conflict of interests between the sender and the receivers, rendering full information revelation, in general infeasible. We demonstrate that an exogenous bias in the sender's preferences can improve public information provision and raise welfare. Two applications of the setup are discussed.

Date: 2025-09
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Published in Games and Economic Behavior 136 (2022) 177-196

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:arx:papers:2509.08850

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