Credible Scores

Jacopo Bizzotto and Nathan Hancart

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: We study cheap talk with simple language, where the sender communicates using a score that aggregates a multidimensional state. Both the sender and the receiver share the same payoffs, given by a quadratic loss function. We show that the restriction to scores introduces strategic considerations. First, equilibrium payoffs can be strictly lower than those achievable under commitment to a scoring rule. Second, we prove that any equilibrium score must be either linear or discrete. Finally, assuming normally distributed states, we fully characterize the set of equilibrium linear scores, which includes both the ex-ante best and the worst linear scores.

Date: 2025-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des and nep-mic
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