The Economics and Game Theory of OSINT Frontline Photography: Risk, Attention, and the Collective Dilemma

Jonathan Teagan

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: This paper develops an economic model of the Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) attention economy in contemporary armed conflict. We conceptualize attention (e.g. social media views, followers, likes) as revenue, and time and risk spent in analysis as costs. Using utility functions and simple game theoretic setups, we show how OSINT actors (amateurs, journalists, analysts, and state operatives) allocate effort to maximize net attention benefit. We incorporate strategic behaviors such as a first mover advantage (racing to publish) and prisoner's dilemma scenarios (to share information or hold it back). In empirical case studies, especially the Ukraine conflict actors like the UAV unit Madyar's Birds and volunteer channels like Kavkazfighter, illustrate how battlefront reporting translates into digital revenue (attention) at real cost. We draw on recent literature and data (e.g., public follower counts, viral posts) to examine trends such as OSINT virality. Finally, we discuss policy implications for balancing transparency with operational security, citing calls for verification ethics and attention sustaining narratives. Our analysis bridges conflict studies and economics, highlighting OSINT as both a public good and a competitive product in today's information war.

Date: 2025-09
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