Choice Paralysis in Evolutionary Games

Brendon G. Anderson

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: In this paper, we consider finite-strategy approximations of infinite-strategy evolutionary games. We prove that such approximations converge to the true dynamics over finite-time intervals, under mild regularity conditions which are satisfied by classical examples, e.g., the replicator dynamics. We identify and formalize novel characteristics in evolutionary games: choice mobility, and its complement choice paralysis. Choice mobility is shown to be a key sufficient condition for the long-time limiting behavior of finite-strategy approximations to coincide with that of the true infinite-strategy game. An illustrative example is constructed to showcase how choice paralysis may lead to the infinite-strategy game getting "stuck," even though every finite approximation converges to equilibrium.

Date: 2025-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dcm and nep-evo
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