Matching to two sides

Chao Huang

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: This paper studies a matching problem in which a group of agents cooperate with agents on two sides. In environments with either nontransferable or transferable utilities, we demonstrate that a stable outcome exists when cooperations exhibit same-side complementarity and cross-side substitutability. Our results apply to pick-side matching problems and membership competition in online duopoly markets.

Date: 2025-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des and nep-mic
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