An analysis of government subsidy policies in vaccine supply chain: Innovation, Production, or Consumption?

Ran Gu, Enhui Ding and Shigui Ma

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: Vaccines play a crucial role in the prevention and control of infectious diseases. However, the vaccine supply chain faces numerous challenges that hinder its efficiency. To address these challenges and enhance public health outcomes, many governments provide subsidies to support the vaccine supply chain. This study analyzes a government-subsidized, three-tier vaccine supply chain within a continuous-time differential game framework. The model incorporates dynamic system equations that account for both vaccine quality and manufacturer goodwill. The research explores the effectiveness and characteristics of different government subsidy strategies, considering factors such as price sensitivity, and provides actionable managerial insights. Key findings from the analysis and numerical simulations include the following: First, from a long-term perspective, proportional subsidies for technological investments emerge as a more strategic approach, in contrast to the short-term focus of volume-based subsidies. Second, when the public is highly sensitive to vaccine prices and individual vaccination benefits closely align with government objectives, a volume-based subsidy policy becomes preferable. Finally, the integration of blockchain technology positively impacts the vaccine supply chain, particularly by improving vaccine quality and enhancing the profitability of manufacturers in the later stages of production.

Date: 2025-10
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