Identification in Auctions with Truncated Transaction Prices

Tonghui Qi

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: Many auction datasets with reserve prices do not include bids that fall below the reserve. This paper establishes nonparametric identification results in first- and second-price auctions when transaction prices are truncated by a binding reserve price under a range of information structures. In the simplest case-where the number of potential bidders is fixed and known across all auctions-if only the transaction price is observed, the bidders' private-value distribution is identified in second-price auctions but not in first-price auctions. Identification in first-price auctions can be achieved if either the number of active bidders (those whose bids exceed the reserve) or the number of auctions with no sales (all bids below the reserve) is observed. When the number of potential bidders varies across auctions and is unknown, the bidders' private-value distribution is identified in first-price auctions but not in second-price auctions, provided that both the transaction price and the number of active bidders are observed. Finally, I extend these results to auctions with entry costs, which face a similar truncation issue when data on potential bidders who do not enter are missing.

Date: 2025-10
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