Token Is All You Price

Weijie Zhong

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: We build a mechanism design framework where a platform designs GenAI models to screen users who obtain instrumental value from the generated conversation and privately differ in their preference for latency. We show that the revenue-optimal mechanism is simple: deploy a single aligned (user-optimal) model and use token cap as the only instrument to screen the user. The design decouples model training from pricing, is readily implemented with token metering, and mitigates misalignment pressures.

Date: 2025-10, Revised 2025-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des, nep-mic and nep-pay
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://arxiv.org/pdf/2510.09859 Latest version (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:arx:papers:2510.09859

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Papers from arXiv.org
Bibliographic data for series maintained by arXiv administrators ().